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In 1999, Poland reformed its public pension system so as to ensure its
solvency, altering the benefit formula and increasing the statutory retirement
age. This paper examines the 1999 reform to estimate the response of private
saving to changes in public pension wealth—that is, to identify the extent to
which private saving substitutes for mandatory public pension wealth—using
the fact that the reform had a differential impact on individuals depending on
their year of birth. Individuals who were older than 50 years at the time of the
reform were not directly affected by the reform and were allowed to stay in the
pre-reform system with high benefit-to-salary replacement rates. Individuals
who were 50 years old or younger at the time of the reform were to receive
pension benefits computed according to a less generous post-reform pension
formula. The reform therefore created large variation among people of similar
ages in expected public pension wealth, providing a setting similar to a natural
experiment.
Longer life expectancy and falling fertility have led to reform of many
countries’ public pension systems, and understanding how such reforms are
likely to affect private saving is important because resources accumulated as
private savings affect investment in capital, economic growth, and living
standards. Accordingly, the degree of substitution between public pension
wealth and private saving is a key aspect of debates over public pension
reform.
We begin by estimating a set of difference-in-differences regressions,
where we calculate the change in household saving rates and expenditures
before and after the reform for the affected and unaffected cohorts. Next, in
order to estimate the degree of substitution between private saving and public
pension wealth, we calculate expected pension wealth under the pre-reform
and post-reform legislation for every household and relate this variable to the
observed household rate of saving. Because pension wealth is likely to be
endogenous with respect to saving, we instrument pension wealth using an
interaction indicator for whether a household head belongs to a cohort affected
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by the reform and whether the household is observed after the reform.
Instrumenting in this way allows us to purge variation in pension wealth due to
unobserved differences among households in tastes for saving, and hence to
identify an exogenous source of variation in pension wealth.
The quasi-experimental variation in pension wealth is useful because the
substitutability between private saving and public pension wealth is
theoretically ambiguous. The canonical life-cycle model predicts perfect
substitution between private saving and pension wealth; however, Feldstein
(1974) suggests that, if pension systems induce people to retire earlier and
extend the period during which they consume out of accumulated assets, a
public pension system could in fact increase private saving. It seems safe to
conclude that the illiquid nature of public pension wealth complicates any
sharp theoretical predictions about its relationship with private saving.
The empirical literature on substitution between public pension wealth and
private saving has also been inconclusive. Feldstein (1974) finds that an
additional $1.00 of Social Security wealth depresses private saving by up to
$0.50—a degree of substitution between private saving and Social Security
wealth of 0.5. Feldstein and Pellechio (1979), Bernheim (1987), and Alessie,
Kapteyn, and Klijn (1997) also find a high degree of substitution, typically 0.5
or more. Other research finds less substitution (King and Dicks-Mireaux 1982;
Hubbard 1986; Hurd, Michaud, and Rohwedder 2012), while Pozo and
Woodbury (1986) find evidence that Social Security increases private saving.1
Early differences over the estimated degree of substitution between private
saving and public pensions were due largely to different empirical strategies,
but recent papers have found varying degrees of substitution despite similar

1

In addition to the debate over substitution between public pensions and
private saving, a related literature estimates whether private household saving
is reduced by private pensions (e.g. Cagan 1965; Katona 1965; Munnell 1976;
Engelhardt and Kumar 2011; Yang 2014) and by tax-deferred pension
accounts (e.g. Venti and Wise 1990; Gale and Scholz 1994; Chetty et al.
2014). Bernheim (2002) and Gale (2005) review this literature.
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approaches to identification. A key difficulty lies in how to account for
unobserved traits that influence both saving decisions and public pension
wealth (see Gale (1998) for a discussion of other econometric biases in this
literature). Much of the recent literature has searched for exogenous shifts in
public pension wealth as a source of identification. Attanasio and Brugiavini
(2003), Attanasio and Rohwedder (2003), Bottazzi, Jappelli, and Padula
(2006), Aguila (2011), Banerjee (2011), and Feng, He, and Sato (2011) use
differential impacts across groups and time created by pension reform as a
source of variation in pension wealth and apply variants of the difference-indifferences approach. However, whereas the first four papers find a degree of
substitution ranging between 0.50 and 0.75, Feng, He, and Sato (2011) report a
modest relationship of less than 0.20. (Table 7, later in the paper, summarizes
the findings of these studies.) Finally, an influential paper by Chetty et al.
(2014) uses detailed administrative data to study the effects of introducing
government-mandated automatic pension contributions in Denmark and finds
evidence of no substitution between private saving and public pensions.
Thus, despite relying on convincing identification strategies, the empirical
literature remains divided about the degree of substitution between public
pensions and private saving. It is therefore important to complement the
existing literature with analysis from other settings and different institutional
arrangements.
The main results reported here show that 1 Polish zloty (PLN) less of
public pension wealth increases household saving by about 0.3 PLN, on
average—that is, the degree of substitution between public pension wealth and
private saving is estimated to equal about 0.3. The degree of substitution is
less for less-educated households than for those with college education (for
whom public pension wealth and private saving appear to be close substitutes).
We present several sensitivity checks, in which we vary assumptions about
households’ subjective discount rate and projections of future earnings and

4

pension wealth, and use somewhat different samples. The results are robust to
these checks.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section I provides
background on Poland’s public pension system in the years before and after
the reform. Section II describes the data and variables from the Polish
Household Budget Surveys and discusses the empirical strategy used in the
analysis. Section III describes the results and Section IV discusses the findings
and concludes. We relegate detailed variable definitions and the discussion of
criteria used to construct the analysis sample to Online Appendices A and B.

I. Poland’s 1999 pension reform
A. Overview2
In the early 1990s, Poland had a relatively generous public pension system
financed on a pay-as-you-go basis. However, the combination of use of early
retirement options, increased life expectancy, and low fertility raised questions
about the system’s fiscal long-term solvency. In order to help finance the
system, the contribution rate was successively raised in the early 1990s, but it
soon became apparent that these increases provided only a temporary solution
and that Poland’s public pension system needed a major reform. The initial
steps toward reform were formulated in 1994, and in the following years
negotiations were held regarding the choice of a funding system and transition
rules.
Following the initial phase, the plan to reform the pension system
accelerated in the fall of 1997. Although it was expected that a pension reform
would take place in some form, the details of who would be affected and to
what extent were still a matter of uncertainty in 1998. The final details were
approved in October 1998, and the new pension system took effect on January

This section is based on Chłoń-Domińczak (2002), who provides a detailed
description of Poland’s pension system and the events leading up to the
reform.
2
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1, 1999. As Chłoń-Domińczak (2002) points out, an important factor driving
the haste in reforming the pension system was a supportive public, which
perceived the old pension arrangements as a carryover from communist days.
Table 1 highlights the main differences between the pre-reform pension
system (in Column (1)) and the post-reform pension system (in Column (2)).
Like many pension reforms, the Polish reform was implemented gradually so
as to give individuals time to adjust. Column (2) in Table 1 describes the
features of the post-reform system once it reaches a “steady state.”
[Table 1 about here]

B. Impact of the reform across cohorts
The gradual implementation of the reform affected individuals differently
depending on their year of birth, which allows us to study the impact of the
reform by comparing a cohort unaffected directly by the reform with a
“treated” cohort affected by the reform.
We define the comparison group as consisting of households whose head
was born between 1939 and 1948 and thus was older than 50 years at the time
of the reform (and hence unaffected by the reform). The treated group consists
of households whose head was born between 1949 and 1958 and thus was 50
years old or younger at the time of the reform. Hence, the comparison and
treatment groups consist of households whose head was born within 10 years
before or 10 years after January 1, 1949, the date separating the groups. Later
in the paper, we conduct a robustness check in which we limit the estimation
sample to only include those born between 1944 and 1953—i.e., within five
years before or five years after 1949.
Figure 1 shows how the treated group was affected by the reform. It plots
the average household gross replacement rate by birth year of the household
head. The replacement rate is defined as the ratio of the first gross monthly
pension benefit to the last preretirement gross monthly earnings. For each birth
year, the line with the black circles shows the replacement rate according to
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the post-reform legislation. Hence, those born prior to 1949 were not directly
affected by the reform and could expect a gross replacement rate of about 60
percent both before and after the reform. However, those born in 1949 or later
will receive a less generous pension and hence have a lower replacement rate.3
[Figure 1 about here]
For example, those born in 1957 are affected by the reform and can expect
to receive a gross replacement rate equal to 40 percent. The line with the
hollow circles denotes the counterfactual average replacement rate had the prereform system continued unchanged. In this counterfactual world (without the
pension reform), those born in 1957 would expect to have a gross replacement
rate equal to about 60 percent. Hence, those born in 1957 experienced a drop
of about 20 percentage points in their expected replacement rate. By any
standard, this is a large reduction.

II. Data and Methods
A. Data
The data we use come from the Polish Household Budget Surveys (Badanie
Budżetów Gospodarstw Domowych, or BBGD), collected by the Polish
Central Statistical Office (see Barlik and Siwiak (2011)). The BBGD is a
monthly survey of household income and expenditure; it also includes detailed
demographic and labor market information (e.g., earnings, occupation, and
industry). Each month, about 3,100 households are interviewed, or about
37,500 households annually (about 0.3 percent of Poland’s population).
Demographics, labor market information, and most sources of income are
collected at the individual level, while expenditure and housing information is
reported at the household level. We use data for the years 1997–2003, which

3

All calculations in Figure 1 hold the retirement age the same for both
scenarios; see Online Appendix A for details. The percentage-point drop
reported in the figure corresponds closely to the net replacement rate drop
reported in chart 8 of Chłoń-Domińczak (2002, 128).
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allows us to observe five years after the implementation of the 1999 reform.
The main analysis sample consists of households whose head was born
between 1939 and 1958. The data include a small longitudinal component.
Overall, 70 percent of our estimation sample is observed only once and we
therefore treat the data as repeated cross-sections. We cluster the standard
errors at the household level to account for the correlation of the residuals for
the households that appear more than once in the sample.
Following the literature (e.g., Attanasio and Brugiavini 2003; Attanasio
and Rohwedder 2003; Aguila 2011), we construct the household saving rate as
a household’s available income minus total household expenditure divided by
household available income. (Household available income is defined as gross
income minus real estate taxes.)
The pension wealth variable is constructed in three steps (described in
detail in Online Appendix A). First, we estimate lifetime earnings profiles for
each household head (and for the spouse if present). Second, pension wealth is
computed using pension regulations in force in the year the household is
observed. (Online Appendix A details the assumptions made in computing
pension wealth.) Third, we define “expected pension wealth” as the
household’s present value of the sum of benefits, adjusted by survival
probabilities obtained from the Polish life tables (see Brugiavini, Maser, and
Sundén (2005) for a discussion of approaches to estimating pension wealth).
There are clearly other approaches to estimating the level of pension
wealth, and in the results section, we conduct several robustness checks.
However, because our analysis focuses on the relationship between pension
wealth and private saving at the margin, the method of modeling the level of
pension wealth should be less important than correctly measuring the changes
in pension wealth (Attanasio and Brugiavini 2003).
Table 2 presents descriptive statistics for the estimation sample. For
expenditure, the saving rate, earnings, and pension wealth (divided by
earnings), we report sample means, standard deviations, and median values.
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For the other variables, we report means and (for continuous variables)
standard deviations. The median saving rate is about 9 percent and the average
saving rate is about 2 percent. The average age of the household head is about
48 years (“treated” household heads are on average 46 years old and
“comparison” household heads are on average 54 years old).
[Table 2 about here]

B. Consequences of the reform: identifying effects using
difference-in-differences
We begin our analysis of the effects of the 1999 reform by comparing the
mean outcomes of the comparison and treated groups. To do so, we estimate
multiyear difference-in-differences (DD) regressions of the following form:
(1)

𝑆𝑅𝑖𝑡 = ∑𝑗 𝛼𝑗 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑗 + 𝜑𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑡 + ∑𝑗 𝛿𝑗 (𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑗 × 𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑡 ) + 𝐱 𝑖𝑡 𝜸 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 ,

where SR is the saving rate of household i in year t, Year denotes year
dummies (j = 1997, 1999, …., 2003 and so year 1998 is the omitted category),
Treated is a dummy that equals 1 if the household head belongs to the cohort
directly affected by the reform (those born between 1949 and 1958) and 0
otherwise (those born between 1939 and 1948, are the omitted category),
Year×Treated denotes interactions between the year dummies and the treatedgroup dummy, and  is the regression error term. Finally, because about 30
percent of households appear in the estimation sample more than once, we
cluster the standard errors by household.4
The estimated δs are the reduced-form, regression-adjusted differences in
saving rates of the treated group, relative to the comparison group and holding
pre-reform differences between the treated and comparison groups constant.

4

We have also estimated models where we cluster standard errors by year of
birth. Our results remain statistically significant, but our preferred approach is
to cluster on the household level as clustering by year of birth, effectively
leaves us with only 20 clusters.
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To increase the precision of the estimates, we include a vector of controls,
denoted by x, that includes an intercept, month-of-year dummies, a quadratic
polynomial in age, gender, number of persons in the household (household
size), number of children, marital status, education dummies, occupation
dummies, a dummy for working in the private sector, and a dummy for
whether the household owns the house it lives in (i.e., place of residence). We
do not include estimated lifetime earnings on the right-hand side of Equation
(1), as lifetime earnings may have been affected by the reform. Instead, we use
education and occupation indicators, which were largely determined before the
reform. The analysis is conducted at the household level. All control variables
reflect the characteristics of the household head, except for household size,
number of children, and a dummy for whether the household owns the house it
lives in, as those variables are household characteristics.
In addition to using the saving rate as the outcome variable, we also
estimate Equation (1) using the log of household expenditure as the outcome.
We view the log expenditure regression as a robustness check. Specifically,
finding that the δ-estimates from the log expenditure model are a mirror image
of the δ-estimates from the saving rate model would imply that the effect of
pension reform on the measured saving rate (available income minus
expenditure, divided by available income) results from pension reform’s effect
on expenditure rather than on available income.
The data cover the years 1997–2003. Using two years of data prior to the
reform, 1997 and 1998, allows us to test for pre-existing group-by-time trends.
The presence of pre-reform differences in outcomes between the comparison
and treatment groups would call into question whether the differences
observed after the reform can be interpreted as its consequences. Using five
years of data after the reform, 1999–2003, allows us to examine whether the
response to the reform was delayed.
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C. Consequences of the reform: estimating the degree of
substitution between public pensions and private saving
While the DD estimator presented in Equation (1) has the advantage of being
transparent, it is not directly informative of the degree of substitution between
public pension wealth and private saving. In particular, we need to estimate
how changes in expected pension wealth affect the saving rate. This subsection
discusses the instrumental variable (IV) estimator we use to identify the degree
of substitution. We then describe an additional adjustment to the pension
wealth variable, Gale’s Q adjustment (Gale 1998), which corrects the bias
occurring due to observing households with varying planning horizons.
IV estimator
The model of interest can be written as follows:
(2)

𝑆𝑅𝑖𝑡 = 𝜃𝑃𝑊𝑖𝑡 + ∑𝑗 𝛼1,𝑗 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑗 + 𝛼2 𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑡 + 𝐱 𝑖𝑡 𝛄1 + 𝑒𝑖𝑡 ,

where SR is the saving rate of household i in year t, PW is expected household
pension wealth divided by current gross household earnings, Year denotes
year dummies (j = 1997, 1999, …., 2003, with 1998 as the omitted category),
Treated is a dummy equal to 1 if the household head belongs to the cohort
directly affected by the reform (0 otherwise), x is a vector of controls
described in Section II.B, and e is an error term.
The coefficient of main interest is the substitution parameter θ, which
gives the change in the saving rate in response to a change in public pension
wealth as a proportion of current gross household earnings. We define the
degree of substitution as the absolute value of θ: if a decrease in PW increases
household saving, we would expect θ to lie between −1 (complete
substitution) and 0 (no substitution).
OLS estimates of Equation (2) will be inconsistent for θ if PW and e are
correlated. For example, some individuals may have an unobserved “taste for
saving” that leads them both to save more and to have higher pension wealth.
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If so, then the OLS estimator of θ will be positively biased, although precision
will not necessarily be affected. Also, pension wealth may be measured with
error. If so, under the classical error-in-variables assumption, the OLS
estimator of θ will be attenuated and imprecise (although θ should have the
correct sign).5
To correct these potential sources of bias, we make use of two
institutional features of the 1999 pension reform described above. First, the
1999 pension reform shifted the expected level of PW for some households but
not for others. Second, this shift depended only on predetermined factors,
namely individuals’ year of birth. It follows that a valid instrumental variable
for PW will be the interaction term between (i) Post-reform — a dummy equal
to 1 if the household head is observed in 1999 or later (0 otherwise) and (ii)
Treated — the indicator for whether the household head belongs to a cohort
directly affected by the reform, as already described. (Meyer (1995, 159)
discusses combining IV and DD methods.)
This leads to the following first-stage equation for the determination of
pension wealth:
(3)

𝑃𝑊𝑖𝑡 = 𝜅0 (𝑃ost-reform × 𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑)𝑖𝑡 + ∑𝑗 𝜅1,𝑗 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑗 + 𝜅2 𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑡 + 𝐱 𝑖𝑡 𝛄2 + 𝜉𝑖𝑡 ,

where the interaction term, Post-reform×Treated, is the IV for PW. Because it
varies only due to the reform, this IV is unlikely to be correlated with the error
term in Equation (2). The exclusion restriction is that the reform affected the
saving rate only through its effect on PW. Given these assumptions, the
estimate of θ is the estimated effect of pension wealth on the saving rate,
identified through the differential impact of the reform on the treated and
comparison groups. Furthermore, this IV is relevant as it is highly correlated
with PW (the first-stage regression F-test statistic exceeds 100). (In estimating

5

Alessie, Angelini, and van Santen (2013) discuss problems with
measurement error in pension wealth.
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the IV model, as with the DD estimator, we cluster the standard errors by
household.)
As with the DD estimator (Equation (1)), we also use the log of household
expenditure as an outcome in Equation (2). In the IV case, the change in log
expenditure is estimated as a response to a change in pension wealth
(proportional to current gross household earnings). By analogy to the DD
estimator, we expect the θ-estimates from the log expenditure model and
saving rate model to be mirror images.
Accounting for differences in the planning horizon
Gale (1998; 2005) shows that estimates of substitution from a cross-sectional
regression of saving in year t on pension wealth in year t—i.e. the present
value of a stream of benefits occurring in the future—will be biased toward 0.
Specifically, in the case of complete substitution (θ = −1), the cross-sectional
estimate of θ will equal −Q, where 0 < Q < 1. This attenuation occurs because
the θ-estimate will reflect a one-time increase in saving (i.e., in year t)
following a decrease in pension wealth rather than an increase in saving over
the full planning horizon. As a remedy, Gale (1998) proposes an adjustment
factor, known in the literature as Gale’s Q, which is a function of the
subjective discount rate, the point in the life cycle at which an individual is
observed, and the point in the life cycle when the individual (re)optimizes her
saving—e.g., after a change in expected pension wealth.
To see how this factor can be derived, consider the following simple
discrete-time model adapted from Attanasio and Rohwedder (2003) and
generalized in Feng, He, and Sato (2011). Suppose an individual lives T
periods. From period t = s until t = TR−1, she works and receives exogenously
determined income y, and from period t = TR until t = T, she is retired and
receives pension benefits, p. In each period, she has to decide how much to
consume and how much to save for the future. The problem can be expressed
as
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(4)

𝑐

𝑦

𝑝

𝑡
𝑡
𝑡
𝑇
max ∑𝑇𝑡=1 𝛽 𝑡−𝑠 𝑢(𝑐𝑡 ) s. t. ∑𝑇𝑡=𝑠 𝑅𝑡−𝑠
≤ ∑𝑇𝑅−1
𝑡=𝑠 𝑅 𝑡−𝑠 + ∑𝑡=𝑇𝑅 𝑅 𝑡−𝑠 ,

𝑐𝑡

where c denotes consumption, R = (1+r) with r representing the real interest
rate, and β is the subjective discount factor.
Suppose that, as in Attanasio and Rohwedder (2003), u(c) = log(c).
Without loss of generality and to simplify the notation, assume that R = 1.
Consumption for any period t, as seen from period s, can then be expressed as
(5)

1−𝛽

𝑇
𝑐𝑡 = 𝛽 𝑡−𝑠 𝑐𝑠 , where 𝑐𝑠 = (1−𝛽𝑇−𝑠+1 ) [∑𝑇𝑅−1
𝑡=𝑠 𝑦𝑡 + ∑𝑡=𝑇𝑅 𝑝𝑡 ],

which implies that the saving rate in any period t, as seen from period s, can be
expressed as
(6)

𝑆𝑅𝑡 ≡

𝑦𝑡 −𝑐𝑡
𝑦𝑡

1−𝛽

= 1 − 𝛽 𝑡−𝑠 (1−𝛽𝑇−𝑠+1 ) [

𝑇
∑𝑇𝑅−1
𝑡=𝑠 𝑦𝑡 +∑𝑡=𝑇𝑅 𝑝𝑡

𝑦𝑡

].

Gale (1998) shows that if one estimates Equation (6) by regressing the
saving rate on pension wealth, in the scenario where the true degree of
substitution is complete, the coefficient on pension wealth will not equal −1,
but rather −Q, where
(7)

1−𝛽

𝑄 = 𝛽 𝑡−𝑠 (1−𝛽𝑇−𝑠+1 ).

Gale shows that, in principle, one can recover the unbiased estimate of
substitution by dividing the substitution estimate by Q or by multiplying each
household’s pension wealth by Q.6 The additional information needed includes
an assumed value for β, as well as specifying s—the point in time when the
household made its consumption plan—and (T−s)—the remaining planning
horizon for each household whose head is t years old in the data.
Equation (6) describes the optimal saving rate for each period t as seen
from period s. However, if an unexpected shock to pension wealth occurs at
6

Gale (1998) also shows that even if the true degree of substitution is less than
complete, a regression of the saving rate on pension wealth will understate the
true degree of substitution by a factor of Q.
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some later period—e.g., at the end of period τ−1—then, from period τ onward,
the household would behave according to a reoptimized consumption plan,
given the level of assets carried over from the previous period. Therefore, for
households experiencing a shock to pension wealth, the appropriate
adjustment factor for any period t ≥ τ is
(8)

1−𝛽

𝑄 ∗ = 𝛽 𝑡−𝜏 (1−𝛽𝑇−𝜏+1 ) ,

which takes into account the shorter remaining planning horizon.
In practice, for households affected by the reform, we apply the Q*
adjustment, setting τ equal to the age of the head of household when the 1999
pension reform occurred and setting t equal to the current age of the household
head. T−τ is set to equal the head’s remaining life expectancy after the reform.
For households unaffected by the reform, we apply the Q adjustment factor,
setting t equal to the current age of the household head and setting s equal to
the age when the head last reoptimized her optimal consumption plan. We
assume this to be the time of the collapse of the People’s Republic of Poland
in 1989, an event that changed the economic environment in Poland (although
it did not affect pensions directly). T−s is set to be equal to the remaining life
expectancy of the household head. For both Q and Q*, we follow Attanasio
and Brugiavini (2003) and Attanasio and Rohwedder (2003) and assume that β
equals 0.98. We examine this assumption in more detail in our sensitivity
analysis in Section III.D.

D. Validity of the estimates
Internal validity of our estimates depends on a number of factors. First, the
substitution estimate would be attenuated if the pension reform were
anticipated before 1999, leading households to adjust their behavior in
advance. Second, because our identifying variation stems from comparing
households from various cohorts over time, internal validity depends on the
degree of comparability of the treated and comparison groups. Third, if the
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groups studied differed in unobserved ways before and after the reform (e.g., if
unobserved factors affected the difference in trends between cohorts), the
Post-reform×Treated dummy and the regression error term would be
correlated. Fourth, internal validity would be compromised if other factors
confounded the effect of the reform.
A number of factors arguably strengthen the internal validity of the
analysis. First, the particulars of who would and would not be affected by the
1999 pension reform were not decided upon before October 1998. In
consequence, the treated group had little time to adjust their behavior before
the reform. In Section III.D, we conduct a robustness check where we drop
households observed between October and December 1998, to exclude those
who may have reacted to the legislated changes before they came into force on
1 January 1999. These estimates are similar to the main estimates.
Second, the comparison and treated cohorts are observed in our data at
slightly different stages of their lives, which might result in unobserved
heterogeneity across the cohorts before and after the reform that could be due
to different age patterns of saving. However, the cohorts are, arguably
sufficiently close in age for their patterns of saving to be very similar absent
the reform. We also condition the estimates on age polynomials and other
demographics. In Section III.D, we conduct robustness checks in which we
narrow the age span between cohorts still further. Our estimates turn out to be
robust to these different assumptions.
Third, in order to correct for measurement error in pension wealth using
our IV approach, the Post-reform×Treated dummy cannot be correlated with
measurement error in pension wealth. Because measurement error in pension
wealth is likely to be of greater concern the more different in age the treated
and comparison groups are over time, we focus our analysis on a relatively
narrow age span.
Fourth, Poland was undergoing other reforms at the time of the pension
reform. Hence, one may wonder whether our estimates are confounded by the
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effects of these other reforms. To our knowledge, though, no reform or other
change during the period 1999−2003 (the post-reform observation period)
affected people who were born in 1949 or later in a different way from people
born before 1949.
Finally, we believe that because the 1999 pension reform was a large,
nationwide reform, and because its implementation resembles a natural
experiment, estimates based on the reform should provide generalizable
insights for retirement policy in other contexts.

III. Results
A. Difference-in-differences estimates
Figure 2 plots the values of the average saving rate for the comparison group
(dashed line) and the treated group (solid line) between 1997 and 2003.
Between 1997 and 1998, the saving rates of both the treated and comparison
groups declined in parallel, supporting the common trends assumption needed
to identify the effect of the reform. However, starting in 1999, the saving rate
of the treated group recovered from its 1998 low, whereas the saving rate of
the comparison group continued to fall. The falling saving rate of the
comparison group and the comparatively steady saving rate of the treated
group suggest that the saving rate of the treated group after the reform
increased relative to the comparison group and relative to before the reform.
In order to interpret this relative increase as a causal effect of the reform,
we need to be able to interpret the time-profile of the saving rate of the
comparison group as a valid counterfactual. Available evidence suggests that
during 1997–2003 the overall aggregate voluntary household saving rate in
Poland (calculated in relation to gross domestic product) declined in a pattern
similar to that experienced by the comparison group in Figure 2. Specifically,
the aggregate voluntary household saving rate fell from about 10 percent in
1997 to about 5 percent in 2003 (2014 World Bank Report on Poland, figure
2.11, page 15). That the aggregate voluntary saving rate and the saving rate of
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the comparison group both fell during the period in question tends to support
the identifying assumption—in the absence of the pension reform, the saving
rates of the treated and comparison groups would have fallen in parallel.
[Figure 2 about here]
Figure 3 complements Figure 2 by showing regression-adjusted differences
between the treated and comparison groups for the saving rate (top panel) and
for log expenditure (bottom panel). (These are estimates of δs from Equation
(1), so the outcomes of the treated group are shown relative to the comparison
group and relative to the pre-reform year 1998, which allows us to examine
potential pre-reform group-by-time trends.) The point estimates are presented
for 1997–2003 with 95 percent confidence intervals (the whiskers).
[Figure 3 about here]
The absence of statistically significant differences between the treated and
comparison groups in the pre-reform year 1997 lends further support to the
common trends assumption required to interpret the point estimates for 1999–
2003 as effects of the reform (Angrist and Pischke 2009, 237–41). The relative
changes after 1999 show that the saving rate tended to increase over time (and
log expenditure tended to decrease) for the treated group in the post-reform
years, although the estimates are somewhat imprecise in 2000.7
In summary, Figure 3 suggests that the estimated effects on the saving rate
in the post-reform years are positive and lie between 0 and 5 percentage
points. This finding suggests that the reduction in pension benefit generosity
due to the reform led to an increase in the rate of saving and a decrease in
expenditures. Although the DD estimates suggest a causal link between the

7

In Figure B.1 in Online Appendix B, we test for pre-existing group-by-time
trends by using the 1995 and 1996 waves of the BBGD. Unfortunately, these
two waves do not have information on occupation, a key variable in the
definition of our sample and calculation of pension wealth, so we are unable to
use these waves in our main analysis. Nevertheless, Figure B.1 tends to
confirm the lack of significant differences in pre-reform saving and
expenditure patterns between the treated and comparison groups.
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pension reform and saving behavior of households, they are not directly
informative about the degree of substitution. To estimate the latter, we turn to
the IV estimates of the model in Equations (2) and (3).

B. Estimated effects of pension wealth on the saving rate and
expenditure
The left column of Table 3 shows the estimates of substitution (θ) from
Equation (2) using the saving rate as the dependent variable. The right column
of Table 3 shows the estimated effect of pension wealth on expenditure from
Equation (2). Panel A shows the estimates obtained using OLS without
instrumenting PW by Post-reform×Treated and where PW is not adjusted by
the Q-factor. Panel B shows the estimates obtained using IV where PW is
instrumented by Post-reform×Treated but where PW is not adjusted by the Qfactor. Panel C shows the estimates obtained using IV where PW is
instrumented by Post-reform×Treated and where PW is adjusted by the Qfactor. We do not report coefficients on other right-hand-side variables.
[Table 3 about here]
The OLS estimates of substitution (θ) presented in Panel A of Table 3 are
very close to 0, possibly because of measurement error in the dependent
variable. Furthermore, when using log expenditure as an outcome, the OLS
point estimate has an unexpected negative sign, implying that a decrease in
pension wealth increases household expenditures. The two IV estimates in
Panel B are also small, but both have the expected sign: negative for the
saving rate and positive for log expenditure. In the case of log expenditure as
an outcome, the difference in sign between the OLS estimate in Panel A and
the IV estimate in Panel B is consistent with the OLS estimator being biased
because of unobserved heterogeneity, a result also found by Attanasio and
Rohwedder (2003) and Engelhardt and Kumar (2011).
The estimates of main interest are in Panel C, using IV with Q-adjusted
pension wealth. These estimates have the expected signs and are larger in
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absolute terms than the estimates in Panel B. This is because in Panel C each
household’s pension wealth is multiplied by the Q-factor and, while
multiplying pension wealth by Q does not change the sign of the estimate of
substitution, it does rescale the estimate. Hence, the estimates in Panel C
suggest that a 1 PLN decrease in pension wealth increases private saving by
about 0.29 PLN and decreases spending by about 0.34 PLN.8
The change in magnitude between the IV estimates in Panel B and C is
comparable to the change reported by Feng, He, and Sato (2009), where the
substitution estimate obtained using unadjusted pension wealth equaled –
0.014, while the substitution estimate obtained using Q-adjusted pension
wealth equaled –0.257.
The estimates presented in Table 3, Panel C, as in most recent studies of
public pension substitution, differ from those of Chetty et al. (2014), who find
that in Denmark the relationship between private saving and public pensions is
zero. The reason could be as simple as differences in cultural norms with
regard to saving between Denmark and countries such as Poland, Italy, or the
United Kingdom.9 Another possible reason is that while our analysis—as well
as that of Attanasio and Brugiavini (2003), Attanasio and Rohwedder (2003),
and Bottazzi, Jappelli, and Padula (2006)—identifies substitution in the
context of reforms that reduced pension wealth, Chetty et al. (2014) examine a
setting that increased pension wealth. Similarly, Feng, He, and Sato (2011)

8

When using ten separate dummies for each of the year-of-birth cohorts
affected by the reform interacted with Post-reform, and controlling for year
dummies and year-of-birth cohort dummies, we obtain somewhat smaller
effects: θ = –0.175 (standard error = 0.11) for the saving rate and θ = 0.131
(standard error = 0.10) for log expenditure.
9
For example, using comparable cross-country data from the Survey of
Health, Ageing and Retirement in Europe (SHARE), Alessie, Angelini, and
van Santen (2013) study public pensions and saving in different regions of
Europe. However, contrary to both Chetty et al. (2014) and evidence from the
Italian pension reforms (Attanasio and Brugiavini 2003; Bottazzi, Jappelli, and
Padula 2006), they find that substitution is largest in Northern European
countries and smallest in Southern (and Eastern) European countries.
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study the effects of introducing a pension system and find a low degree of
substitution. Hence, although standard expected utility theory predicts that the
saving response should be symmetrical with respect to increases and decreases
in pension wealth, the response of private saving may in fact depend on the
direction of change in pension wealth.10
Differences between Chetty et al. (2014) and other studies could also result
from differences in the degree of awareness of the respective reforms. As with
the Italian reform, the debate about Poland’s 1999 pension reform was highly
visible in the media, which could be reflected in a relatively large observed
response. Finally, whereas Chetty et al. use a regression-discontinuity design
to identify the effect of mandated saving for individuals close to the
discontinuity, we use variation resulting from a broad-based reform to identify
the degree of substitution across an entire population.

C. Analysis of subsamples
Previous research on financial literacy has found that households may not
fully understand the details of how public pension systems work (Lusardi and
Mitchell 2014). One might speculate that better-educated individuals are better
informed about pension systems in general, are more likely to be “active”
savers (Chetty et al. 2014), or are financially more able to adjust their savings.
If so, we would expect a larger degree of substitution for better-educated
households. For example, using three Italian reforms (in 1992, 1995, and
1997), Bottazzi, Jappelli, and Padula (2006) find the degree of substitution to
be about 0.8 among individuals who are well informed about the pension
system. Gale (1998) also finds substitution close to 0.7 for highly-educated
households in the United States (compared with 0.5 in the full sample).

10

This asymmetry could be understood in the context of prospect theory,
which highlights the importance of reference points and holds that individuals
react more strongly to losses than to corresponding gains.
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The accumulated value of assets other than pension wealth might also
influence the sensitivity to changes in pension wealth. In theory, we would
expect households that have accumulated a buffer stock to be less sensitive to
pension wealth changes than those without assets. Since the BBGD does not
collect information on financial assets, we split the sample by houseownership status, treating house ownership as an indicator for housing wealth.
Table 4 presents IV estimates for different subsamples: in the top panel,
we split households by the head’s level of education, while in the bottom panel
we split households by house-ownership status. For households where the
head has at least tertiary (that is, university) education, the point estimates
suggest complete substitution. For households with less-educated heads, the
estimated substitution is less than one-third.
[Table 4 about here]
We find little difference between the substitution estimates of households
that own and do not own a house. This finding is puzzling because it suggests
that Polish households ignore their housing wealth when making decisions
about saving. A possible explanation is that Polish households treat their
housing assets as a key element of their future bequest. For example, there is
very little evidence of household downsizing in Poland as individuals age and
become widowed. In such a scenario, housing represents a very illiquid asset,
limiting the extent to which the household would be willing to substitute
between discretionary saving, pension wealth, and housing wealth.
Another reason for the lack of difference by house ownership, might be a
limited ability to borrow against housing equity (e.g., in the form of home
equity loans). Angelini, Brugiavini, and Weber (2011) find a clear negative
correlation between measures of mortgage market development, such as loanto-value ratios, and the share of elderly homeowners who report difficulties
making ends meet (an indicator of financial distress). Using data from the
2006–07 wave of the SHARE survey, they show that in Poland about 70
percent of elderly homeowners reported financial distress, the highest value in
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their sample of thirteen European countries. At the same time, the authors
report that between 2003 and 2006, the typical loan-to-value ratio in Poland
was about 50 percent, the second lowest value in their sample. Hence,
although elderly homeowners in Poland at this time were likely to own their
homes outright, they were also likely to report a high degree of financial
distress, and this financial distress appears to be correlated with a low level of
development of the market for home equity. Although we do not have direct
evidence, we speculate that low levels of development of the mortgage market
can be viewed as a proxy for the absence of financial instruments allowing
homeowners to borrow against housing equity.

D. Robustness analysis
In this section, we conduct four robustness checks by changing the definitions
of the analysis sample, one robustness check where we alter the computation
of pension wealth, and a robustness check where we change the assumptions
regarding the Q-factor.
Redefining the analysis sample
The main estimation sample consists of 8,854 households in the comparison
group and 28,550 households in the treated group (see Table 2), so we begin
our sensitivity analysis by examining the role of this imbalance by randomly
selecting 8,854 households from the treated group. The IV estimates are given
in Panel A of Table 5, and the degree of substitution estimated is similar in
magnitude and precision to the main results in Panel C of Table 3.
[Table 5 about here]
In Panel B of Table 5, we restrict the analysis sample to cohorts whose
birth year is closer to 1949, in order to limit potential unobserved
heterogeneity between the comparison and treated groups. We select
household heads born between 1944 and 1948 for the comparison group and
household heads born between 1949 and 1953 for the treated group. The
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estimates in this sample are close to the main estimates in Table 3—about –
0.39 for the saving rate and 0.23 for log expenditure.
The BBGD expenditure categories were redefined starting in 1998, so in
Panel C of Table 5 we re-estimate the model after excluding the data from the
1997 survey. By using this smaller sample, the point estimates are somewhat
smaller in absolute terms than in the main specification—about –0.22 for the
saving rate and about 0.29 for log expenditure.11
In the main estimates, we include households headed by men up to age 65
and women up to age 60. However, these age limits are close to typical
retirement ages and could include households that are already transitioning to
retirement. To exclude such households, Panel D restricts the analysis sample
to households headed by men up to age 60 and women up to age 55. The main
results are robust to this restriction as well.
Different assumptions about pension wealth calculation
In Panel E of Table 5, we recalculate pension wealth by assuming retirement
occurs at 55 for men and 50 for women, instead of 65 for men and 60 for
women as with the main estimates. The resulting point estimates are larger in
absolute value—about –0.43 for the saving rate and 0.50 for log expenditure.
This higher degree of substitution makes sense, as the calculation shortens the
contribution period of the cohorts affected by the reform.12

11

We also re-estimated the model excluding observations for
October−December 1998 as well as the year 1997. Recall that the reform bill
was passed in October 1998, so a sizable share of pre-reform observations are
observed in the last months of 1998. If these households had reacted to the
reform before January 1999, we would expect to see a slightly lower degree of
substitution. For this sample, we obtain θ = –0.24 (standard error = 0.11) for
the saving rate and θ = 0.29 (standard error = 0.11) for log expenditure.
12
We also re-estimated the model with female spouse’s lifetime earnings
estimated using OLS rather than a selection model. The estimates are similar,
although larger than the baseline estimates in Table 3, Panel C.
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Sensitivity to different values of the subjective discount factor
Section III.B showed that the estimated substitution effects depend on whether
the value of pension wealth is adjusted by the Q-factor. This factor in turn
depends on the choice of the subjective discount factor, β. Typically, β has
been set between 0.96 and 0.98, but there is no clear consensus as to what
value it should take.13 In this subsection, we check the sensitivity of the
substitution estimates to different assumptions about β.
Table 6 maps selected values of β to the values of the Q-factor and to the
estimates of substitution using the saving rate as the outcome. For each value
of β listed in Column (1), Column (2) shows the corresponding mean value of
Q in our sample, its minimum value, and its maximum value. Column (3)
shows the resulting IV estimate of substitution from the regression that uses
the same specification as our main estimates (Table 3, Panel C) as a function
of β (and, hence, a function of Q).
[Table 6 about here]
Table 6 shows that for the selected range of β, the Q-factor decreases as the
subjective discount factor β increases, so that, holding other factors equal,
large values of Q (low values of β), imply smaller estimates of substitution
than do small values of Q (high values of β). For example, for β equal to 0.90,
the substitution estimate is about –0.08, while for β equal to 0.999, the
estimate is about –0.42. In the range of the most popular choices of β used in
the literature—between 0.96 and 0.98—we obtain substitution estimates in a
relatively narrow range—between about –0.20 and –0.29. Still, the sensitivity
of estimates to the choice of the discount factor is an important result to note.

13

Aguila (2011) assumes it to be 0.90, Gale (1998) assumes it to equal 0.96,
Alessie, Angelini, and van Santen (2013) set it to 0.97, and Attanasio and
Brugiavini (2003), Attanasio and Rohwedder (2003), Bottazzi, Jappelli, and
Padula (2006), and Feng, He, and Sato (2011) assume it to be 0.98; see also
Table 7.
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IV. Discussion and conclusion
We have studied the large change in expected pension wealth induced by
Poland’s 1999 pension reform to estimate the effect of public pensions on
private household saving. Implementation of the reform created quasiexperimental variation in pension wealth suitable for investigating whether
households increase private saving in response to reduced generosity of a
public pension plan.
The difference-in-differences estimates displayed in Figure 3 show the
reform increased household saving and decreased expenditure. The main IV
estimates in Panel C of Table 3 suggest that, overall, public pensions increase
private saving by about 0.3 PLN for each 1.0 PLN decrease of pension wealth.
This is a sizable degree of substitution, although it is far from complete.
Combined with the conclusions of Lindner and Morawski (2012) that the
reform had little effect on labor supply, the estimates suggest that, when faced
with a reduction in future pension benefits, older households in Poland choose
to adjust their saving rather than their labor supply.
We find that for highly-educated households—those we expect to be
informed about the reform or who are financially better able to adjust—
substitution between private saving and pension wealth is close to complete.
We speculate that the more modest response among lower-educated
households could be due to liquidity constraints, incomplete information, or
uncertainty about how enduring the 1999 reform would be. The relatively
passive behavior of less-educated households echoes findings in the literature
on financial literacy, which suggests that by remaining passive, these
households risk being inadequately prepared for retirement (Lusardi and
Mitchell 2014). This, in turn may suggest a need for improved financial
literacy, especially among groups at risk of insufficient retirement resources.
The main estimate of the degree of substitution of about 0.3 is at the lower
end of the range of existing estimates. Table 7 summarizes recent studies
using methods similar to ours, lists the data and sample definitions applied,
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and, whenever possible, documents the variation in the degree of substitution
by age. Among the studies that split the analysis by age, substitution tends to
be higher for people aged roughly 40 to 55 years, an age interval similar to the
one examined in this paper. (See, for example, Attanasio and Rohwedder
(2003), where the degree of substitution equals about 0.65 for ages 43−53, and
Feng, He, and Sato (2011), where it equals about 0.38 for ages 46−59.) In
comparison, the estimated degree of substitution from the Polish reform is
relatively small and closest to the estimate for 46−55-year-olds reported by
Attanasio and Brugiavini (2003), about 0.24. Hence, despite using similar
methods and imposing similar age restrictions for their samples, these papers
report varying degrees of substitution. A systematic study of the reasons for
these differences across countries and pension reforms would be highly useful.
[Table 7 about here]
Finally, the robustness checks in Table 6 show that the estimates of the
degree of substitution depend to some extent on assumptions about the
subjective discount rate. For example, our main estimate of the degree of
substitution of about 0.3 assumes a discount rate of 2 percent. Assuming
instead a higher discount rate (4 percent) yields a degree of substitution closer
to 0.2. This difference could be large enough to carry implications for policy.
In order for researchers to make recommendations about the impact of public
pensions on saving, we need to know more about the values of subjective
discount rates and their distribution in the population. On the whole, we prefer
to err on the side of caution and interpret our main estimate of the degree of
substitution as an upper bound.
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Figure 1: Simulated mean household gross pension replacement rate, by year
of birth, 1939−58
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Note: Authors’ calculations using Badanie Budżetów Gospodarstw
Domowych (BBGD). The replacement rate is defined as the ratio of the first
monthly gross pension benefit to the last pre-retirement gross monthly
earnings; see Online Appendix A for details on how pension benefits are
calculated. The line with the black circles denotes the actual mean replacement
rate by the household head’s birth year. The line with the hollow circles
denotes the counterfactual pre-reform mean replacement rate (i.e., the
replacement rate that would have applied in the absence of the reform) for the
cohorts affected by the reform by the household head’s birth year. The dashed
vertical line indicates 1949, the first birth-year cohort affected by the reform.
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Figure 2: Mean saving rate in the BBGD, by year and group
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Note: Authors’ calculations using the BBGD. The saving rate is defined as
available household income minus total household expenditure, divided by
available household income. The dashed line indicates the comparison group,
born 1939–48, and the solid line indicates the treated group, born 1949–58.
The dashed vertical line indicates the first year of the reform.
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Figure 3: Estimated effect of the 1999 pension reform on the saving rate and
log expenditure, by year
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Note: The figure shows point estimates from Equation (1) where the outcome
variable is regressed on six year dummies, a “treated” dummy (if born 1949–
58), treated-by-year interaction terms, and the same controls as listed in the
notes to Table 3. Each panel shows the treated-by-year interaction point
estimates (δs) over time. The omitted categories are year 1998 (the year before
the reform) and the comparison group (if born 1939–48). The figure presents
95-percent confidence intervals (whiskers) based on standard errors that are
robust and clustered by household. The dashed vertical line indicates the first
year of the reform.
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Table 1: Key features of Poland’s public pension system before and after the
1999 reform

Financing and contributions
Financing

Benefit calculation
Benefit formula

(1)
Pre-reform system

(2)
Post-reform system (steady
state)

Pay-as-you-go, defined
benefit

Pay-as-you-go, notionally
defined contribution (NDC)
plan (first tier) and a funded
defined contribution (FDC) plan
(second tier). NDC contribution
is 12.22 percent of salary; FDC
is 7.3 percenta

Flat rate plus an earningsrelated component

Actuarially-adjusted and
annuity-based on total
contributions.
Lifetime earnings

Pension base

Average of 10 best years out
of 20 years prior to retirement

Minimum years of
contributions
Minimum (and maximum)
pension benefit b

20 for women, 25 for men

20 for women, 25 for men

35 percent of average national
wage (maximum earningsrelated benefit: 250 percent of
average national wage)

20 percent of average national
wage (maximum contribution:
250 percent of average national
wage)

Because of early retirement
options, the effective
retirement ages: 59 for men,
55 for women
Available for most
occupations

65 for men, 60 for women

Retirement age
Normal retirement age

Early retirement provision

Certain groups, women, and
workers in the public sector still
have early retirement privileges
Transition rules
Cohorts born before 1949
Cohorts born after 1969 fully
fully covered by the precovered by the new system.
reform system, including the Cohorts born 1949–1968 could
right to retire early as in the
choose to make only NDC
pre-reform system
contributions.c Separate rules
for the first five cohorts of
women affected by the reform
(born 1949–53)
Replacement rate at 65 years 65–76 percent for men, 70
40−60 percent for men, 30–50
(men) and 60 years (women)d percent for women
percent for women
Source: Adapted from Chłoń, Góra, and Rutkowski (1999) and Chłoń-Domińczak (2002)
a
Unisex life tables used in the NDC plan.
b
Maximum benefit is set implicitly by the maximum contribution rate; see Chłoń-Domińczak
and Strzelecki (2013).
c
Majority chose to participate in the NDC plan; see Chłoń-Domińczak (2002).
d
Replacement rate defined as the ratio of first annual benefit to last annual salary.
Calculations from Chłoń, Góra, and Rutkowski (1999, 36–7) and Chłoń-Domińczak (2002,
128). Simulation assumes the statutory retirement age under both regimes: 60 for women, 65
for men.
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Table 2: Sample descriptive statistics
Variable
Dependent variables
Log expenditure
Saving rate
Characteristics of household head
Age
Female (percent)
Marital status (percent)
Unmarried
Married
Widowed
Divorced or separated
Educational attainment (percent)
Tertiary education
Postsecondary nontertiary education
Upper secondary education
Lower secondary vocational education
Gymnasium
Primary vocational education
Primary education
Preprimary education
Occupationa (percent)
Legislators, senior officials, and managers
Professionals
Technicians and associate professionals
Clerks
Service workers and shop sales workers
Craft and related trades workers
Plant and machine operators and assemblers
Elementary occupations
Works in the private sector (percent)
Comparison group (percent)
Treated group (percent)
Observed before reform (percent)
Observed after reform (percent)
Characteristics of the household
(Gross) Current earnings (2005 PLN)
(Gross) Expected pension wealth/current earnings
Number of persons in the household
Number of children below the age of 15
Household owns the place of residence (percent)
Sample size, N

Mean

Standard
deviation

Median

7.63
0.02

0.50
0.47

7.62
0.09

47.75
39

4.65

4.70
79.74
5.95
9.61
10.65
3.09
30.39
7.39
0.03
36.37
12.04
0.04
6.29
6.89
15.33
11.90
6.44
27.16
14.79
11.20
45
24
76
33
67

2,260
11.78
3.38
0.48
58
37,404

872
4.32
1.36
0.79

2,019
11.12

Note: The saving rate is defined as available household income minus total
household expenditure, divided by available household income.
a
Occupation is presented here at the one-digit level.
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Table 3: OLS and IV estimates of the effect of unadjusted and Q-adjusted
pension wealth on the household saving rate or log expenditure
Panel A
Unadjusted pension wealth

Saving rate
–0.002
(0.001)

OLS
Log expenditure
–0.007
(0.002)

Saving rate
–0.014
(0.004)

IV
Log expenditure
0.016
(0.004)

Saving rate
–0.293
(0.084)

IV
Log expenditure
0.339
(0.079)

Panel B
Unadjusted pension wealth

Panel C
Adjusted pension wealth

Sample size, N
37,404
37,404
Note: The column on the left shows estimates of substitution between pension
wealth and private saving (θ from Equation (2) with the saving rate as the
dependent variable). The column on the right shows estimated effects of
pension wealth on log expenditure (θ from Equation (2) with log expenditure
as the dependent variable).
Panel A displays OLS estimates. Panel B displays IV estimates, with pension
wealth instrumented by an interaction term between the “post-reform” dummy
and the “treated” dummy. Panel C shows IV estimates, with pension wealth
instrumented as in Panel B and adjusted by the Q-factor. (The first-stage
regression F-statistic test for weak instruments equals 8,384.)
Controls include month-of-year dummies, a quadratic polynomial in age,
gender, number of persons in the household, number of children, marital
status, education dummies, occupation dummies, a dummy for working in the
private sector, and a dummy for whether the household owns its place of
residence. Other variables include a full set of year dummies (with 1998 as the
omitted category), and a “treated” dummy (if born 1949–58; born 1939–48 is
the omitted category).
Robust standard errors clustered by household are in parentheses.
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Table 4: Heterogeneity analysis: IV estimates of the effect of Q-adjusted
pension wealth on the household saving rate or log expenditure for selected
subsamples of households
Head of household has
Head of household has less
at least tertiary education
than tertiary education
Saving rate
Log
Saving rate
Log
expenditure
expenditure
Adjusted
–1.076
1.200
–0.252
0.278
pension wealth
(0.504)
(0.439)
(0.084)
(0.081)
Sample size, N

Adjusted
pension wealth

3,983
3,983
Household owns
the place of residence
Saving rate
Log
expenditure
–0.276
0.301
(0.107)
(0.121)

33,421
33,421
Household does not own
the place of residence
Saving rate
Log
expenditure
–0.320
0.380
(0.100)
(0.117)

Sample size, N
21,880
21,880
15,524
15,524
Note: Columns on the left show the estimates of substitution between pension
wealth and private saving (θ from Equation (2) with the saving rate as the
dependent variable). Columns on the right show estimated effects of pension
wealth on log expenditure (θ from Equation (2) with log expenditure as the
dependent variable). All estimates are obtained by IV, with pension wealth
adjusted by the Q-factor and instrumented by an interaction term between the
“post-reform” dummy and the “treated” dummy. Controls are the same as in
Table 3. Robust standard errors clustered by household are in parentheses.
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Table 5: Robustness checks: IV estimates of the effect of Q-adjusted pension
wealth on the household saving rate or log expenditure obtained using
alternative analysis samples or alternative construction of pension wealth
Panel A: sample restricted so that the “treated” group has the same size
as the comparison group
Saving rate
Log expenditure
Adjusted pension wealth
–0.243
0.271
(0.106)
(0.096)
Sample size, N
17,708
17,708
Panel B: sample restricted to cohorts born 1944–53
Saving rate
Log expenditure
Adjusted pension wealth
–0.390
0.227
(0.164)
(0.150)
Sample size, N
20,147
20,147
Panel C: sample restricted to using only years 1998–2003
Saving rate
Log expenditure
Adjusted pension wealth
–0.215
0.286
(0.098)
(0.095)
Sample size, N
31,149
31,149
Panel D: sample where male household heads are younger than 61
years and female household heads are younger than 56 years
Saving rate
Log expenditure
Adjusted pension wealth
–0.283
0.305
(0.086)
(0.081)
Sample size, N
36,723
36,723
Panel E: pension wealth calculation assumes that men retire at 55 years
of age and women at 50 years of age
Saving rate
Log expenditure
Adjusted pension wealth
–0.432
0.500
(0.123)
(0.116)
Sample size, N
37,404
37,404
Note: The column on the left shows estimates of substitution between pension
wealth and private saving (θ from Equation (2) with the saving rate as the
dependent variable). The column on the right shows estimated effects of
pension wealth on log expenditure (θ from Equation (2) with log expenditure
as the dependent variable). All estimates are obtained by IV, with pension
wealth adjusted by the Q-factor and instrumented by an interaction term
between the “post-reform” dummy and the “treated” dummy. Controls are the
same as in Table 3. Robust standard errors clustered by household are in
parentheses.
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Table 6: Robustness check: IV estimates of the effect of Q-adjusted pension
wealth on the household saving rate (θ) as a function of the subjective
discount factor, β
(1)
(2)
(3)
Value of β
Mean Q implied by β
Estimate of θ implied by β
0.90
0.076
–0.076
[0.023, 0.121]
0.96
0.048
–0.203
[0.028, 0.067]
0.97
0.044
–0.243
[0.028, 0.060]
0.98
0.040
–0.293
[0.027, 0.053]
0.99
0.036
–0.354
[0.026, 0.047]
0.999
0.033
–0.421
[0.025, 0.042]
Note: Column (1) lists different values of the subjective discount factor, β, and
Column (2) shows the corresponding mean Q-factor (with minima and
maxima in square brackets). Column (3) shows the resulting IV estimate of the
effect of Q-adjusted pension wealth on the household saving rate (θ from
Equation (2)). The baseline model (in italics) sets β equal to 0.98, and is the
same as in Table 3, Panel C.
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Table 7: Estimates of the degree of substitution between public pension wealth and private saving, selected studies of
pension reforms using methods similar to this paper
Study

Source of variation in
pension wealth

Sample and data

Attanasio and Brugiavini 2003

Pension reform in
Italy

Employed or retired household heads in the
Italian Survey of Household Income and
Wealth (SHIW) in 1989, 1991, 1993, and
1995, aged 20−65. Subjective discount factor
set to 0.98

Attanasio and Rohwedder 2003

Series of pension
reforms in the UK

Exclude households headed by someone selfemployed or retired from the UK Family
Expenditure Survey in 1974−87. Subjective
discount factor set to 0.98

Bottazzi, Jappelli, and Padula 2006

Series of pension
reforms in Italy

Aguila 2011

Pension reform in
Mexico

Employed or self-employed household heads
in the Italian SHIW in 1989−2002, aged
20−50. Subjective discount factor set to 0.98
Households headed by a person covered by
Social Security in the Mexican National
Income and Expenditure Survey in years
1992, 1994, 1996, and 1998. Subjective
discount factor set to 0.90
Employed, urban households in the 1995 and
1999 China Household Income Project, aged
25−59. Subjective discount factor set to 0.98

Degree of substitution between
public pension wealth and private
saving
0.10 for 20−35-year-olds;
0.75 for 36−45-year-olds;
0.24 for 46−55-year-olds;
< 0.10 for 56−65-year-olds.
Overall substitution between 0.04
and 0.33. (Table 5, column (3) and
Table 4)
0 for 20−31-year-olds;
0.55 for 32−42-year-olds;
0.65 for 43−53-year-olds;
0.75 for 54−64-year-olds.
No estimate for overall substitution
reported. (Table 5, first column)
0.65 overall substitution (Table 9,
fourth column)
0.55−0.60 overall substitution
(p.18)

0 for 25−39-year-olds;
0.38 for 40−59-year-olds.
Overall substitution about 0.20
(Table 9)
Notes: The degree of substitution refers to the absolute value of the proportional increase (or decrease) in private saving in response to a decrease (or
increase) in public pension wealth. Reported estimates from the papers cited.
Feng, He, and Sato 2011

Pension reform in
China
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Online Appendix A: Sample, variables, and calculation of
pension wealth
In this appendix, we discuss the details of restrictions with respect to the analysis
sample, computation of lifetime earnings, and the assumptions and steps made in
the process of calculating future pension benefits and expected pension wealth.

A.1 Sample selection
1. In order to reduce the influence of outliers, for each year of the Polish
Household Budget Surveys (Badanie Budżetów Gospodarstw Domowych, or
BBGD), we trim the available household income below the 1st and above the 99th
percentile.
2. In years 1998, 1999, 2000, and 2003, the BBGD contains information on the
year and month of birth. In other years (1997, 2001, and 2002), we compute it as
the difference between the year and month of the survey and the current age of the
respondent reported in years in the data. Additionally, since the BBGD contains a
small two-observation rolling-panel component, for years 2001 and 2002 for
some observations, we match the month of birth from the information in 2000 and
2003 data, respectively.
3. In the main analysis sample, we keep households whose head was born
between 1939 and 1958; hence, the year of birth of the household head is within
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10 years before or 10 years after 1949, the birth year of the first cohort directly
affected by the reform.
4. We only include households for which we observe the household head’s
occupation at the time of the survey. The information on occupations is necessary
for sample selection and for the computation of lifetime earnings; see Section A.2.
5. We drop all of the households in which the head or the spouse works in
farming or in the agricultural industry, or in which the main household income
comes from agriculture.
6. We exclude households in which the head or the spouse works in the following
occupations: the armed forces, legislators, miners, or educators. We do this
because these occupations have special pension arrangements.
7. We exclude households where the head receives earnings from being selfemployed because of the insufficient reliability of self-employment earnings
information and the lack of details on the level of their pension contributions.
8. We drop households whose main source of income is retirement or disability
pensions and those in which the household head receives income from these
sources.
9. The final sample consists of 37,404 observations, with about 4,100–6,250
observations in each year of data.

A.2 Lifetime earnings profiles
In order to estimate the lifetime earnings profiles, we use households whose head
was born between 1937 and 1980; each year, the sample is restricted to include
18- to 65-year-old male household heads and 18- to 60-year-old female household
heads. Earnings in the BBGD are measured net of taxes and Social Security
contributions. We use the SIMPL tax–benefit microsimulation model for Poland
(see Bargain et al. (2007)) to gross up net earnings so they include taxes and
Social Security contributions. We define total earnings for each person as the sum
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of earnings from temporary and permanent employment in the private and public
sectors, and we express all values in 2005 constant prices.
We forecast log earnings separately for household heads and spouses using
the 1997–2003 waves of the BBGD. For household heads, we calculate the
earnings profiles by estimating an ordinary least squares (OLS) regression of the
earnings of the household head on age, age squared, gender, marital status,
interaction between gender and marital status, education level, occupation
dummies, industry dummies, year dummies, and indicators for decade of birth.
The last category is controlled for in order to allow cohort-specific intercepts to
reflect differences in cohort productivity. We use the predicted log earnings
profile to forecast expected earnings for each household head, given his (her)
characteristics, from the age the head of household was at the time, starting at 23
(25) and going until 65 (60).
We transform predicted log earnings to earnings in levels by using the
exponential function, in which we multiply the exponentiated predicted log
earnings by exp(σ2/2), σ2 being the square of the root mean square error (RMSE)
of the regression.
We model the log earnings process separately for female and male spouses.
For female spouses, we forecast the log earnings profiles using a Heckman
selection correction. This is done to include the large number of zero earnings of
this group. The earnings of the spouse are regressed on age, age squared,
education level, indicators for decade of birth, and year dummies. The “selection
equation” for labor force participation (defined as earnings greater than 0) uses
age, age squared, the number of children in the household who are 14 or younger,
an interaction term between age and the number of children, level of education,
and decade-of-birth dummies. For male spouses, we estimate log earnings profiles
by an OLS regression of the earnings of the male spouse on age, age squared,
education level, indicators for decade of birth, and year dummies. We use the
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predicted log earnings profiles to forecast earnings for each spouse using the
transformation described above, given his (her) characteristics, from the age the
spouse was at the time, starting at 23 (25) and going until 65 (60).
When computing the lifetime earnings profiles, we assume that, except for age
and its square, all the current characteristics are fixed and the profile changes with
age and its square.

A.3 Pension benefit and pension wealth calculation
We calculate future public pension benefits based on the entitlement that
individuals will have acquired by the time they transition into old-age retirement
according to the legislation at the time of the observation. Hence, the changes
induced by the pension reform will reflect on expected pension benefits in the
years 1999–2003. In 1997 and 1998, expected pension benefits are calculated
according to the pre-reform legislation.
Pre-reform pension benefits
In the pre-reform system (see Chłoń-Domińczak 2002), the old-age pension
formula consisted of a common economy-wide component and an individual
earnings-based component.
The common economy-wide component of the pension benefit consisted of 24
percent of economy-wide average earnings. The individual earnings-based
component was based on the individual’s 10 best consecutive years of work out of
the 20 years prior to retirement. This individual-based average was then
multiplied by the number of years of work contributions and by 1.3 percent. In the
pre-reform system, nonwork contributory years also counted (e.g. years spent in
college, in military service, and on maternity leave), and the individual-based
average was multiplied by a factor of 0.7 percent. In the pre-reform system, there
were also a minimum pension and a maximum. The individual earnings-based
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component was capped at a maximum of 2.5 times economy-wide average
earnings. The minimum pension benefit was set at 35 percent of economy-wide
average earnings.
Specifically, we compute the pre-reform pension benefit as 𝑏𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑓𝑖𝑡 =
max{0.35𝐵𝐴, 0.24𝐵𝐴 + min{𝐶𝐴𝐸, 2.5𝐵𝐴} × (0.013𝐶𝑊 + 0.007𝐶𝑁𝑊 )}. BA
stands for the “basic amount,” the average economy-wide earnings published by
the Polish Statistical Office, Główny Urząd Statystyczny (GUS); CAE stands for
“countable average earnings,” based on the average of the 10 best years of work
contributions out of the last 20 years; CW stands for years of work contributions,
which were at least 20 years for women and 25 for men; and CNW stands for years
of nonwork contributions (e.g. military service or maternity leave), which were
limited to a maximum of one-third of the total number of years of contributions.
Assumptions for computing pre-reform benefits. We compute the 10 best years
of each individual based on the forecast lifetime earnings profiles described in
Section A.2. In our calculations, we assume that men and women contribute fully
to the system, according to the pre-reform legislation: 25 years of work
contributions for men and 20 for women. We also assume that men have three
years of nonwork contributions (at the time, there was two years’ compulsory
military service) and that women have five years of nonwork contributions. We
assume that women retire at age 60 and men at 65. Since the pre-reform minimum
pension benefit was benchmarked to the economy-wide average earnings
published by GUS, we assume that this economy-wide average grows by 4
percent annually in real terms.
Post-reform pension benefits and initial capital
The cohorts we study who have participated for at least one year in the pre-reform
system were entitled to an “initial capital” sum that converted the contributions
they had made so far into a starting capital sum, beginning in 1999 for the
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reformed notionally defined contribution (NDC) plan; Chłoń-Domińczak (2002,
126) provides a detailed explanation of how the initial capital sum was computed.
The initial capital consists of an economy-wide component and a personspecific component. The formula for the economy-wide component of initial
capital requires computing the following correction factor, CF:
𝑎𝑔𝑒 𝑖𝑛 1998 − 18
𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑠 𝑜𝑓 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑏𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠 𝑖𝑛 1998
𝐶𝐹 = min {1, √
×
},
𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑖𝑟𝑒𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑎𝑔𝑒 − 18 𝑟𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑟𝑒𝑑 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑠 𝑜𝑓 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑏𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠

where the formula sets retirement age to 60 for women and 65 for men and
required years of contributions to 20 years and 25 years respectively. The initial
capital is computed as 0.24  BA  CF  G62, where G62 is the unisex life
expectancy for a 62-year-old in 1998 and BA is the basic amount, defined above.
In our calculations, we compute years of contributions as of the end of 1998 as the
age of an individual in 1998 minus 23 years (minus 25 for women, to account for
sporadic labor force participation). We compute G62 as a simple average of 62year-old men and women’s life expectancy in 1998.
The person-specific initial capital is computed in the following way. For each
person, we predict earnings five years back in time and obtain economy-wide
average earnings for five years back in time. We divide the predicted earnings by
economy-wide average earnings and compute an average, which we multiply by
the basic amount for 1999 and by 0.7 percent times the number of years of
nonwork contributions up to 1999 and by 1.3 percent times the number of years of
work contributions up to 1999. As before, we assume that, given each person’s
age in 1999 and our assumptions regarding when people start to work, men have
at most 25 years of work contributions and women have at most 20. Also, as
before, we assume that given each person’s age in 1999, men have at most three
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years of nonwork contributions and women have at most five years of nonwork
contributions. All of our calculations are indexed to 2005 constant prices.
For the years after the 1999 reform until the year of retirement, we calculate
contributions as 19.52 percent of an individual’s gross earnings (the legislated
level of retirement contributions from 1999). We compute the post-reform
pension benefit as
𝑏𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑓𝑖𝑡 =

𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑖𝑟𝑒𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡

𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑎𝑙 𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙+0.1952 ∑𝑡=1999

𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑠𝑡

𝑢𝑛𝑖𝑠𝑒𝑥 𝑙𝑖𝑓𝑒 𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑦 𝑎𝑡 𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑖𝑟𝑒𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡

.

The minimum pension benefit is defined as 24 percent of average economywide earnings in the year of retirement (Chłoń-Domińczak and Strzelecki 2013).
Finally, for the first five cohorts of women affected by the reform, we
compute the pension benefit according to the mixed pre-reform and post-reform
pension formula described in Table A.1.
Assumptions for computing post-reform benefits. We assume that men
contribute continuously until they retire at 65 years of age and that women
contribute continuously until they retire at 60. The pension benefit is computed as
the sum of person-specific and economy-wide initial capital and the contributions
of an individual’s earnings divided by the remaining unisex life expectancy at the
statutory age of retirement.

Pension wealth
The general formula for computing pension wealth is the following:
𝑝𝑟𝜏|𝑎𝑔𝑒(𝑖) × 𝑏𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑓𝑖𝑡(𝑖) × (1 + 𝑔)𝜏−𝑟𝑒𝑡.𝑎𝑔𝑒
𝑃𝑊(𝑖) = ∑
,
(1 + 𝑟)𝑟𝑒𝑡.𝑎𝑔𝑒−𝑎𝑔𝑒(𝑖)
𝜏=𝑟𝑒𝑡.𝑎𝑔𝑒
𝑚𝑎𝑥.𝑎𝑔𝑒

where
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•

PW(i): pension wealth of individual i;

•

ret.age: retirement age, set at 65 for men and 60 for women;

•

g: real growth rate of pension benefit;

•

r: real interest rate;

•

max.age: maximum attainable age, set at 100 years (the end of the life table);

•

𝑝𝑟𝜏|𝑎𝑔𝑒(𝑖) : the probability that someone aged age(i) will be alive at age 𝜏 =
ret.age, . . . , max.age;

•

benefit(i): pension benefit of individual i, computed as described above.
Assumptions for computing pension wealth. When calculating pension wealth,

we adjust the future stream of pension benefits using separate male and female
survival probabilities from the 1999 Polish life tables from GUS. The maximum
age is also taken from the life tables and is set to 100 years for everyone. If a
spouse receives retirement or disability benefits, we use those to compute pension
wealth. We use a 3 percent real interest rate to compute the present value of the
sum of expected benefits.
We compute pension benefits separately for the household head and the
spouse and then take their sum. For female household heads, we scale the pension
wealth by 30 percent to account for expected survivor’s pension benefits. The
actuarially-adjusted sum of future pension benefits of the household head and the
spouse is discounted back to the current age of the household head. In all of the
regressions, pension wealth is divided by predicted (fitted) current gross
household earnings, obtained from the predicted values using the estimation
described in section A.2.
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Table A.1: Between-cohort variation in the post-reform pension system
Cohorts:
Born before December 31,
Born between January 1, 1949 and December 31, 1968
1948
(transitory cohorts)
Benefit formula:
Pre-reform formula
Post-reform formula with some exceptions
Exceptions to the benefit formula? No
Separate rules for the first five cohorts of women (born
1949–53)a
The 1949 cohort receives part of the benefit according to
the old pension system formula (80 percent) and the rest
according to the new formula (20 percent).
The 1950 cohort receives a 70/30 percent mix.
The 1951 cohort receives a 55/45 percent mix.
The 1952 cohort receives a 35/65 percent mix.
The 1953 cohort receives a 20/80 percent mix.
Early retirement provisions?

a

Yes

Yes, conditional on age and contribution requirement
being fulfilled before December 31, 2007

From Chłoń, Góra, and Rutkowski (1999, 21).
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Born on or after January 1,
1969
Post-reform formula
No

No early retirement
provisions. In the postreform system, men retire
at 65 and women at 60

Online Appendix B: Sample selection and some results
for the data pooled for the years 1995−2003
The principal sample selection criteria are the same as for the main sample
(described in Online Appendix A). Since for the years 1995 and 1996 we do not
have information on occupation, selection criteria with respect to this variable
cannot be applied. Thus, points 4, 5, and 6 from the list of sample restrictions
given in Section A.1 do not apply. The final sample consists of 53,635
observations, with about 4,215–8,595 observations in each year of data.
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Figure B.1: Estimated effect of the 1999 pension reform on saving rate and log
expenditure, by year
Saving rate
.1

.05

0

-.05

Log expenditure
.05
0
-.05
-.1
-.15
1995

1996

1997

1998

1999

2000

2001

2002

2003

Note: Authors’ calculations using the BBGD, 1995–2003. The universe consists of BBGD for the
years 1995−2003 for households whose head was born between 1939 and 1958. The sample also
omits households whose head works in agriculture (forestry, fishery, and farming), mining, or the
education sector. The figure shows point estimates from a multiyear difference-in-differences
regression of the outcome variable on a “treated” dummy (if born 1949–58), eight year dummies,
treated-by-year interaction terms, and controls. The controls consist of a cubic polynomial in age,
a gender dummy, number of persons in the household, number of children, marital status,
education dummies, and industry dummies. Each panel presents the treated-by-year interaction
point estimate over time. The omitted categories are year 1998 (the year before the reform) and the
comparison group born 1939–48. The regression uses robust standard errors clustered by year of
birth and the figure presents 95 percent confidence intervals (whiskers). The dashed vertical line
indicates the first year of the reform.
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Figure B.2: Mean saving rate, by year and group
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Note: Authors’ calculations using the BBGD, 1995–2003. Saving rate is defined as available
household income minus total household expenditure, divided by available household income. The
dashed line indicates the “comparison group,” born 1939–48, and the solid line indicates the
“treated group,” born 1949–58. The dashed vertical line indicates the first year of the reform.

12

References
Bargain, Olivier, Leszek Morawski, Michal Myck, and Mieczyslaw Socha. 2007.
“As SIMPL as That: Introducing a Tax–Benefit Microsimulation Model for
Poland.” Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) Discussion Paper 2988.
Chłoń, Agnieszka, Marek Góra, and Michal Rutkowski. 1999. “Shaping Pension
Reform in Poland: Security through Diversity.” World Bank Social Protection
Discussion Paper 9923.
Chłoń-Domińczak, Agnieszka. 2002. “The Polish Pension Reform of 1999.” In
Pension Reform in Central and Eastern Europe Volume 1 – Restructuring with
Privatization: Case Studies of Hungary and Poland, edited by Elaine Fultz, 95–
205. Budapest, Hungary: International Labour Office.
Chłoń-Domińczak, Agnieszka, and Paweł Strzelecki. 2013. “The Minimum
Pension as an Instrument of Poverty Protection in the Defined Contribution
Pension System: An Example of Poland.” Journal of Pension Economics and
Finance 12 (3): 326–50.

13

